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NEGOTIABLE  CERTIFICATES  OF  DEPOSIT. 
Bruce  I.  Summers 
Negotiable  certificates  of  deposit  (negotiable  CDs) 
are  the  most  important  source  of  purchased  funds  to 
U.  S.  banks  that  are  practitioners  of  liabilities  man- 
agement.  Moreover,  they  have  become  one  of  the 
major  types  of  liquid  assets  in  the  portfolios  of  many 
investors.  Recent  financial  market  developments, 
including  increased  competition  among  financial  in- 
stitutions,  high  and  sometimes  volatile  patterns  of 
interest  rates,  and  regulatory  changes  have  all  led  to 
significant  changes  in  the  money  markets  generally, 
and  in  the  market  for  negotiable  CDs  in  particular. 
This  article  describes  the  market  for  negotiable  CDs, 
placing  particular  emphasis  on  developments  that 
have  occurred  over  the  past  decade  or  so. 
Types  of  Issuers  It  is  possible  to  distinguish 
between  four  general  classes  of  negotiable  CDs  based 
on  the  type  of  issuer,  because  the  characteristics  of 
these  four  types  of  CDs,  including  rates  paid,  risk, 
and  depth  of  market,  can  vary  considerably.  The 
most  important,  and  the  oldest  of  the  four  groups, 
consists  of  negotiable  CDs,  called  domestic  CDs, 
issued  by  U.  S.  banks  domestically.  Dollar  denomi- 
nated  negotiable  CDs  issued  by  banks  abroad  are 
called  Eurodollar  CDs  or  Euro  CDs,1  while  nego- 
tiable  CDs  issued  by  the  U.  S.  branches  of  foreign 
banks  are  known  as  Yankee  CDs.  Finally,  some 
nonbank  depository  institutions,  particularly  savings 
and  loan  associations,  have  begun  to  issue  negotiable 
CDs.  These  are  referred  to  as  thrift  CDs. 
Domestic  CDs  Negotiable  CDs  issued  by  U.  S. 
banks  domestically  are  large  denomination  (greater 
than  $100,000)  time  deposit  liabilities  evidenced  by  a 
written  instrument  or  certificate.  The  certificate 
specifies  the  amount  of  the  deposit,  the  maturity  date, 
the  rate  of  interest,  and  the  terms  under  which  inter- 
est  is  calculated.  While  banks  are  free  to  offer  market 
determined  interest  rates  on  time  deposits  in  amounts 
above  $100,000,  negotiable  CDs  included,  the  mini- 
1 Some  dollar  denominated  CDs  are  issued  in  foreign 
locations  other  than  Europe.  For  example,  banks  in 
Hong  Kong  have  issued  Asian  CDs,  while  the  branches 
of  at  least  two  U.  S.  banks  have  issued  Nassau  CDs. 
Markets  for  these  instruments  are  just  developing,  how- 
ever. 
mum  denomination  acceptable  for  secondary  market 
trading  in  domestic  CDs  is  $1  million.  The  term  to 
maturity  on  newly  issued  domestic  CDs  is  the  out- 
come  of negotiation  between  a bank  and  its  customers, 
the  individual  instrument  usually  tailored  to  fit  the 
liquidity  requirements  of  the  purchaser.  Regulations 
limit  the  minimum  maturity  on  deposits  of  U.  S. 
banks  to  30  days.2  Newly  issued  domestic  CDs 
typically  have  maturities  that  run  from  30  days  to 
12  months.  The  average  maturity  of  outstanding 
negotiable  CDs  is  about  three  months. 
Interest  rates  on  newly  issued  negotiable  CDs, 
called  primary  market  rates,  are  determined  by  mar- 
ket  forces  and  sometimes  are  directly  negotiated  be- 
tween  the  issuer  and  the  depositor.  Domestic  CD 
rates  are  quoted  on  an  interest-bearing  basis;  rates 
on  most  other  money  market  instruments,  such  as 
Treasury  bills,  bankers  acceptances,  and  commercial 
paper  are  calculated  on  a  discount  basis.  Interest  is 
computed  for  the  actual  number  of  days  to  maturity 
on  a  360-day  year  basis  and  can  be  either  fixed  for 
the  term  of  the  instrument  or  variable.  Interest  on 
fixed-rate  negotiable  CDs  with  original  terms  to  ma- 
turity  of  up  to  one  year  is  normally  paid  at  maturity  ; 
on  longer-dated  instruments,  interest  is  normally  paid 
semiannually.  If  variable,  the  rate  usually  changes 
every  month  or  three  months  and  is  tied  to  the  sec- 
ondary  market  rate  on  domestic  CDs  having  maturi- 
ties  equal  to  the  variable  term  of  the  contract. 
Domestic  CDs  may  be  issued  in  either  registered 
or  bearer  form.  The  great  majority  of  negotiable 
CDs,  however,  are  bearer  instruments.  In  fact,  most 
banks  automatically  classify  bearer  CDs  as  negotiable 
instruments  and  classify  registered  CDs  along  with 
large  time  deposits  open  account  as  nonnegotiable 
instruments. 
Domestic  CDs  are  paid  for  in  immediately  avail- 
able  funds  on  the  day  of  purchase.  They  are  re- 
deemed  for  immediately  available  funds  on  the  ma- 
turity  date.  Many  investors  in  domestic  CDs  prefer 
to  purchase  and  settle  in  New  York.  For  this  reason, 
regional  banks  that  are  active  in  the  CD  market  issue 
a The  Federal  Reserve  Board  has  recently  proposed, 
however,  that  the  minimum  maturity  of  time  deposits  be 
reduced  to  14 days. 
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through  a  New  York  correspondent  bank  acting  as  a 
clearing  agent. 
Early  History3  As  corporations  became  more 
adept  at  cash  management  during  the  1950’s,  they 
were  able  to  economize  on  their  holdings  of  demand 
deposits.  Since  few  banks  offered  corporations  in- 
terest-bearing  deposits  as  alternatives  to  checking 
balances,  businesses  turned  to  other  investment 
sources,  particularly  commercial  paper,  Treasury 
bills,  and  repurchase  agreements  with  securities 
dealers.  Consequently,  there  was  a  sharp  decline  in 
the  importance  of  corporate  deposits  on  the  banking 
system’s  balance  sheet.  Large  money  center  banks 
especially  felt  this  loss  of  funds  since  they  relied  on 
corporate  demand  deposits  to  a  greater  extent  than 
other,  smaller  banks.  This  situation  prompted  First 
National  City  Bank  of  New  York  to  introduce  nego- 
tiable  CDs,  which  were  offered  first  to  the  bank’s 
foreign  customers  in  August  1960.  Investor  response 
to  this  move  was  only  modest,  however,  due  in  part 
to  the  lack  of  a  secondary  market  for  the  certificates. 
In  February  1961  First  National  City  Bank  began  to 
offer  negotiable  CDs  not  only  to  foreign  investors, 
but  to  domestic  investors  as  well.  A  simultaneous 
development  crucial  to  the  success  of  the  new  instru- 
ment  was  the  announcement  by  the  Discount  Cor- 
poration  of  New  York,  a  large  Government  securities 
dealer,  that  it  would  make  a  secondary  market  for 
the  negotiable  CDs  of  money  center  banks. 
The  new  negotiable  CD  was  specifically  designed 
to  attract  corporate  deposits,  and  to  serve  as  a  source 
of  funds  flexible  enough  to  accommodate  changes  in 
short-term  loan  demand.  Other  major  New  York 
banks  quickly  followed  ‘the  lead  of  First  National 
City  Bank  in  offering  negotiable  CDs,  and  most  of 
the  leading  U.  S.  Government  securities  dealers 
quickly  became  active  in  the  secondary  market. 
Within  two  months,  negotiable  CDs  outstanding  at 
New  York  City  banks  reached  $400  million,  and  by 
September  1961  the  figure  rose  to  almost  $1,100 
million. 
It  should  be  noted  that  commercial  banks,  pri- 
marily  the  large  regional  banks  located  outside  New 
York,  had  years  of experience  issuing  interest-bearing 
certificates  of  deposit  and  large  time  deposits  open 
account  prior  to  1961.  Time  deposits  open  account 
had  been  offered  to  the  foreign  depositors  of  banks 
since  the  1930’s.  Also,  banks  would  sometimes  pay 
3 This  discussion  of  the  early  history  of  domestic  CDs 
relies  heavily  on  the  work  of  Brewer  [2]  and  Fieldhouse 
[4]. 
interest  on  “link  certificates”  arranged  by  their  loan 
customers  to  fulfill  compensating  balance  require- 
ments.  Finally,  a  number  of  regional  banks  outside 
New  York  and  Chicago  routinely  issued  negotiable 
CDs  at  the  request  of  their  corporate  customers. 
Although  legally  negotiable,  these  CDs  issued  by 
large  regional  banks  lacked  an  organized  secondary 
market,  a  factor  that  limited  their  use  as  true  money 
market  instruments.  Large  regional  banks  that  had 
been  active  issuers  of  negotiable  CDs  promptly  estab- 
lished  themselves  as  competitors  with  the  New  York 
money  center  banks  in  1961. 
The  Importance  of  Regulation  Unlike  most  other 
participants  in  the  domestic  money  market,  commer- 
cial  banks  are  heavily  regulated.  Government  regu- 
lation  has  had  an  important  influence  on  the  develop- 
ment  of  the  market  for  negotiable  CDs  since  its  in- 
ception.  Two  Federal  Reserve  regulations  in  par- 
ticular  have  had  an  influence  on  the  negotiable  CD 
market,  namely  Regulation  Q,  which  governs  in- 
terest  paid  on  deposits  by  member  banks,  and  Regu- 
lation  D;  which  prescribes  reserve  requirements  that 
must  be  held  against  deposits. 
Until  May  1973,  Regulation  Q  specified  an  interest 
ceiling  that  could  not  be  exceeded  on  newly  issued 
negotiable  CDs  of  at  least  some  maturities.  At  times, 
these  ceilings  were  binding,  i.e.,  they  limited  banks 
to  paying  rates  below  open  market  rates.  In  the 
early  period  of  the  development  of  the  market  for 
negotiable  CDs,  for  example,  there  was  a  1  percent 
ceiling  rate  on  time  deposits  of  less  than  three 
months’  maturity.  Since  market  interest  rates  on 
competing  instruments  were  greater  than  1  percent, 
this  ceiling  effectively  prohibited  banks  from  issuing 
short-dated  CDs.  Then  in  late  1961,  the  rate  on  3- 
month  Treasury  bills  edged  upward  and  exceeded  the 
2½  percent  Regulation  ceiling  rate  in  effect  for  3- 
to  6-month  CDs.  Within  the  first  year  in  which  they 
were  offered,  therefore,  banks  were  forced  into  a 
noncompetitive  position  vis-à-vis  the  money  market 
alternatives  to  negotiable  CDs  in  the  maturity  range 
out  to  six  months. 
In  July  1963  the  Regulation  Q  ceiling  for  CDs 
maturing  in  three  months  or  longer  was  raised  to  a 
competitive  4 percent.  The  artifically  low  rate  ceiling 
on  CDs  of  less  than  three  months’  maturity  was 
raised  in  November  1964,  so  that  banks  were  finally 
able  to  compete  with  other  money  market  instru- 
ments.  In  subsequent  periods,  however,  Regulation 
Q  ceilings  again  became  binding,  with  important 
consequences  for  the  negotiable  CD  market.  These 
episodes  will  be  examined  later  when  growth  in 
domestic  CDs  is  discussed. 
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posits  have  a  minimum  maturity  of  thirty  days.  This 
effectively  restricts  the  minimum  maturity  of  newly 
issued  negotiable  CDs  to  one  month.  Moreover, 
Regulation  prohibits  commercial  banks  from  pur- 
chasing  their  own  outstanding  negotiable  CDs,  an 
action  that  would  be  interpreted  under  the  regulation 
as  payment  of  a  deposit  before  maturity.  Some  in- 
vestors  have  horizons  much  shorter  than  30  days  and 
might  prefer  to  avoid  having  to  routinely  enter  the 
secondary  market  to  raise  cash  by  selling  negotiable 
CDs.  Consequently,  banks  have  had  an  incentive  to 
develop  alternative  instruments  to  negotiable  CDs 
to  meet  these  investors’  demands.  The  30-day  mini- 
mum  maturity  requirement  on  negotiable  CDs  is 
likely  an  important  factor  explaining  the  rapid  growth 
in  bank  repurchase  agreements,  which  are  considered 
nondeposit  liabilities  and  are  therefore  not  subject  to 
the  30-day  minimum  maturity  requirement  on  in- 
terest-bearing  deposits. 
Member  banks  of  the  Federal  Reserve  System,  a 
group  that  accounts  for  the  largest  share  of negotiable 
CDs  outstanding,  have  always  been  required  to  hold 
noninterest-bearing  reserves  against  deposits  as  pre- 
scribed  by  Regulation  D.  Beginning  September  1, 
1980,  all  depository  institutions  having  either  trans- 
actions  accounts  or  nonpersonal  time  deposits  (which 
include  virtually  all  negotiable  CDs)  will  be  required 
to  hold  reserves  as  specified  in  Regulation  D.  Re- 
serve  requirements  increase  the  cost  of  funds  to  de- 
pository  institutions  since  a  portion  of  total  assets 
must  be  set  aside  in  noninterest-earning  reserve  ac- 
counts.  Reserve  requirements  against  negotiable  CDs 
have  varied  over  the  years  and  have  at  times  been 
graduated  by  both  the  maturity  of the  deposit  and  the 
amount  of  total  balances  held.  The  Federal  Reserve 
varies  reserve  requirements  primarily  as  an  aid  in 
achieving  the  objectives  of  monetary  and  credit 
policy.  In  the  case  of  CDs,  however,  Regulation  D 
has  also  been  used  to  achieve  a  bank  regulatory  goal, 
namely  the  lengthening  of  the  maturity  structure  of 
the  commercial  banking  system’s  liabilities.  Thus, 
the  size  of  reserve  requirements  on  CDs  has  at  times 
been  inversely  related  to  maturity. 
Growth  in Domestic  CDs  There  is,  unfortunately, 
no  precise  measure  of  the  total  amount  of  domestic 
negotiable  CDs  outstanding.  This  is  primarily  be- 
cause  not  all  reporting  banks  classify  their  large 
time  deposits  consistently.  The  best  measure  of  the 
volume  of  domestic  CDs  outstanding  is  the  series 
comprising  the  CDs  of  all  large  banks  that  report  to 
the  Federal  Reserve  on  a  weekly  basis  (the  large 
weekly  reporting  banks).  Negotiable  CDs  outstand- 
ing  of  all  large  weekly  reporting  banks  are  shown  on 
Chart  1.  Negotiable  CDs  of  the  large  New  York 
City  banks  and  large  regional  banks  are  shown  sepa- 
rately  on  the  same  chart. 
It  is  clear  from  Chart  1  that  domestic  CDs  have 
grown  rapidly  but  unevenly,  especially  after  1968. 
The  chart  also  shows  that  there  is  a  close  but  im- 
perfect  relationship  between  changes  in  the  volume 
of  outstanding  negotiable  CDs  for  large  regional 
banks  and  for  the  large  New  York  banks.  The  rate 
of  growth  in  negotiable  CDs  issued  by  New  York 
banks  generally  lags  the  rate  of  growth  experienced 
by  the  regional  banks  during  periods  when  outstand- 
ings  are  increasing  rapidly.  During  the  1975-77 
runoff  in  negotiable  CDs,  the  percentage  decline  was 
less  for  the  New  York  banks  than  for  the  regional 
banks;  the  shallower  trough  for  the  New  York 
banks  suggests  that  these  institutions  are  more  reliant 
on  such  deposits  as  a  primary  source  of  funds.  Com- 
paring  the  trends  for  the  two  series  suggests  that 
large  regional  banks  have  been  expanding  their  nego- 
tiable  CD  positions  faster  than  the  New  York  money 
center  institutions,  a  situation  explained  by  the 
spread  of  liabilities  management  practices  outside  the 
money  centers  and  by  the  generally  faster  rate  of 
increase  in  business  lending  at  regional  banks  during 
the  last  decade.  The  share  of  total  negotiable  CDs 
attributable  to  the  New  York  banks  has  trended 
downward  since  1975,  falling  from  nearly  60  percent 
to  less  than  one-third  by  late  1979. 
Within  the  first  decade  of  its  existence,  the  market 
for  negotiable  CDs  suffered  two  major  setbacks  from 
an  otherwise  rapid  growth  trend.  These  episodes, 
which  occurred  in  1966  and  1969-70,  both  were  a 
result  of  binding  Regulation  Q  ceilings.  The  Regu- 
lation  Q  ceiling  on  negotiable  CDs  of  all  maturities 
was  raised  to  5½  percent  in  December  1965,  follow- 
ing  the  pattern  set  by  short-term  open  market  rates. 
When  market  rates  moved  above  this  level  in  early 
1966,  however,  the  Federal  Reserve  took  no  further 
action  to  keep  banks  competitive  in  the  money  mar- 
kets;  this  was  a  departure  from  previous  practice  and 
reflected  the  System’s  desire  to  slow  growth  in  bank 
loans.  Consequently,  new  issues  of  domestic  CDs 
declined  and  outstandings  dropped  by  about  $3  bil- 
lion  or  16  percent  in  the  last  quarter  of  1966.  Sec- 
ondary  market  activity  also  slumped  during  this 
period.  When  short-term  rates  dropped  sharply  in 
early  1967,  however,  new  issue  and  secondary  market 
activity  quickly  recovered. 
This  interest  rate  decline  was  short-lived,  however, 
and  by  late  1967  open  market  rates  again  began  to 
push  up  against  the  Regulation  Q  ceiling.  The  ceiling 
10  ECONOMIC  REVIEW,  JULY/AUGUST  1980 rate  on  6-month  to  l-year  CDs  was  raised  by  one 
percentage  point  to  6%  percent  in  1968,  but  by  later 
in  the  year  even  longer  term  negotiable  CDs  lost 
competitiveness  with  other  money  market  instru- 
ments.  A  wide  gap  opened  between  Regulation  Q 
ceiling  rates  and  open  market  rates  in  1969,  and  this 
gap  was  not  eliminated  when  the  ceilings  were  raised 
on  CDs  of  all  maturities  in  January  1970.  Out- 
standing  negotiable  CDs  declined  by  over  $13  billion, 
or  more  than  half  of  the  total  amount  outstanding, 
between  December  1968  and  February  1970.  The 
decline  would  have  been  even  greater  had  it  not  been 
for  a  special  exemption  that  allowed  banks  to  sell 
CDs  to  foreign  official  institutions  (i.e.,  governments 
and  central  banks)  without  regard  to  the  regulatory 
ceiling.  During  the  runoff,  banks  issued  about  $2 
billion  in  negotiable  CDs  to  such  investors.  The  sec- 
ondary  market  in  negotiable  CDs  almost  completely 
disappeared  during  this  period  as  dealers  eliminated 
their  positions  and  trading  declined  to  almost  zero. 
This,  of  course,  greatly  reduced  the  liquidity  of  the 
remaining  negotiable  CDs  outstanding. 
In  June  1970,  the  collapse  of  the  Penn  Central 
Transportation  Company  gave  rise  to  fears  of  a 
general  liquidity  crisis,  as  businesses  found  them- 
selves  unable  to  issue  commercial  paper.  One  very 
important  action  taken  in  response  to  this  crisis  was 
removal  of  the  Regulation  Q  ceiling  on  short-term 
CDs,  i.e.,  those  with  maturities  from  30  to  89  days. 
Bank  new  issue  rates  on  l-  to  3-month  CDs  quickly 
rose  to  competitive  levels  and  the  volume  of  out- 
standing  CDs  resumed  rapid  growth.  The  ceiling  on 
longer  term  negotiable  CDs  was  removed  three  years 
later  in  May  1973.  Since  the  early  1970’s,  therefore, 
the  market  for  domestic  CDs  has  been  conducted  in 
an  atmosphere  free  of  constraints  on  interest  rates. 
Strong  demand  for  bank  credit,  particularly  for 
business  loans,  led  to  a  boom  in  the  issuance  of  do- 
mestic  CDs  between  1972  and  1974.  During  this 
period  the  Federal  Reserve  attempted  to  dampen 
credit  expansion  by  raising  reserve  requirements  on, 
and  thus  increasing  the  cost  of,  negotiable  CDs.  In 
June  1973,  for  example,  a  3  percent  supplemental 
reserve  requirement  was  added  to  the  existing  5 per- 
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above  the  amount  outstanding  on  May  16,  1973  (a 
20  percent  supplemental  requirement  on  Eurodollar 
borrowings  had  been  in  effect  since  January  1971). 
Simultaneous  changes  were  made  to  lower  reserve 
requirements  on  Eurodollars  in  an  attempt  to  equalize 
the  reserve  costs  for  these  two  sources  of  funds.  In 
September  1973  the  supplemental  reserve  require- 
ment  on  CDs  was  raised  to  6  percent  while  reserve 
requirements  on  Eurodollars  remained  unchanged. 
The  CD  requirement  was  lowered  back  to  3  percent 
in  December,  however.  This  temporary  inequality 
of  reserve  requirements  between  domestic  CDs  and 
Eurodollars  explains  the  temporary  decline  in  CD 
volume  appearing  in  Chart  1  for  the  second  half  of 
1973. 
A  recession-induced  decline  in  business  loan  de- 
mand  of  unprecedented  proportions  occurred  at  large 
banks  between  1975  and  1977.  Domestic  CDs  fol- 
lowed  this  decline,  falling  by  over  $28  billion  in  the 
approximately,  two  year  period  from  January  1975 
to  April  1977.  Rapid  growth  resumed  in  mid-1977 
and  continued  through  1978,  after  which  a  six-month 
decline  totaling  over  $16  billion  occurred.  This  de- 
cline  was  prompted  by  a  surge  in  the  growth  of 
small  time  deposits,  spurred  by  large  increases  in 
Money  Market  Certificates,  combined  with  softening 
in  the  demand  for  total  bank  credit.  Accelerating 
credit  demand  by  businesses,  however,  led  to  renewed 
growth  in  domestic  CDs  after  mid-1979. 
Money Center  versus  Regional  About  one-third 
of  domestic  CDs  are  issued  by  a  handful  of  large 
money  center  banks  in  New  York  City,  while  the 
remainder  are  issued  by  about  two  hundred  large 
regional  banks  located  around  the  U..  S.  Although 
both  the  money  center  and  regional  institutions  sell 
their  newly  issued  instruments  primarily  to  large 
national  and  multinational  investors,  the  former 
group  of  banks  is  much  more  -heavily  involved  in 
this  market.  Banks  issuing  negotiable  CDs  usually 
post  a  list  of  base  rates,  with  spreads  expressed  in 
increments  of  five  basis  points,  for  the  various  ma- 
turities  they  are  writing.  These  rates  are  adjusted 
upward  or  downward  depending  on  the  particular 
bank’s  need.  for  funds  and  on  market  conditions. 
Regional  banks  located  in  cities  that  serve  as  head- 
quarters  for  major  corporations  are  often  able  to 
book  a  large  portion  of  their  CDs  directly  through 
the  main  office,  without  having  to  work  through  a 
New  York  correspondent.  The  regional  issuers  that 
are  most  active  in  the  CD  market,  however,  keep  a 
supply  of  blank  but  signed  certificates  in  New  York 
so that  investors  not  located  in  their  area  and  wishing 
to  purchase  their  CDs  can  do  so  conveniently.  Re- 
gional  banks  that  issue  large  amounts  of  domestic 
CDs  but  that  depend  heavily  on  purchases  by  in- 
vestors  located  outside  their  geographic  area  typically 
employ  a  sales  force  to  actively  market  their  certifi- 
cates. 
Although  almost  all  banks  on  occasion  sell  their 
newly  issued  certificates  to  securities  dealers,  most 
prefer  to  sell  directly  to  investors.  The  advantages  of 
selling  directly  to  retail  include  paying  a  lower  rate 
on  the  new  issues,  since  the  dealer  intermediary  is 
eliminated,  and  having  more  information  over  where 
certificates  are  ending  up.  Banks  would  prefer  that 
their  CDs  be  held  as  investments  and  not  sold  before 
maturity,  since  secondary  market  sales  could  compete 
with  attempts  to  market  new  offerings  in  the  future. 
Although  dealers  sometimes  hold  CDs  for  invest- 
ment  purposes,  most  of  their  purchases  are  passed 
through  to  retail  investors  in  the  secondary  or  resale 
market.  Regional  banks  that  are  attempting  to  build 
a name  in  the  domestic  CD  market,  or  that  are  trying 
to  reestablish  a  name  after  a  period  of  inactivity, 
generally  must  operate  through  dealers.  In  these 
cases,  the  dealers  accept  marketing  responsibility  for 
the  newly  issued  certificates.  When  particularly  large 
offerings,  come  to  market  most  banks,  even  the  money 
center  institutions,  rely  on  dealers  to  help  distribute 
the  issue.  A  new  offering  of  several  hundred  million 
dollars,  for  example,  may  be  difficult  to  place  directly 
even  for  a  bank  with  a large  base  of  regular  cus- 
tomers. 
Over  the  years,  investors  have  developed  prefer- 
ences  for  the  CDs  of  certain  issuers,  or  groups  of 
issuers,  that  are  reflected  in  the  rate  structure  on 
CDs.  The  rate  required  on  the  CD  of  a  top  name 
bank  may  be  5  to  25  basis  points  lower  than  that 
required  on  the  CD  of  a  lesser  known  institution. 
Historically,  the  rate  spread  on  domestic  CDs  of  the 
top  and  lesser  name  issuers  has  fluctuated  with  the 
level  of  interest  rates,  the  spread  widening  in  high 
interest  rate  periods.  Prior  to  1974,  investors  dis- 
tinguished  roughly  between  two  groups  of  issuing 
banks  in  the  domestic  CD  market,  prime  and  non- 
prime.  The  prime  banks  included  the  large  and  well- 
known  major  money-center  institutions,  while  the 
nonprime  category  included  the  smaller,  lesser  known 
regional  banks.  In  1974,  is  concerns  about  the 
liquidity.  of  the  banking  system  were.  aroused  by 
problems  at  Franklin  National  Bank  and  Herstatt 
Bank  of  West  Germany,  investor  tiering  of  domestic 
CDs  by  issuer  became  more  flexible  and  complicated. 
Size  remained  important,  but  investors’  perceptions 
of  financial  strength  began  to  be  formed  more  spe- 
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dropped  in  number  and  tended  to  vary  over  time. 
Nonetheless,  investors  still  place  the  greatest  empha- 
sis  in  assessing  risk  on  bank  size,  so  that  New  York 
City  banks  continue  the  dominate  the  top  tier.  The 
more  conventional  factors  used  to  assess  risk,  for 
example,  capital  ratios,  asset  growth  rates,  and  earn- 
ings  variability,  remain  of  secondary  importance  in 
determining  which  banks  are  classified  in  the  top 
tier.  An  implication  of this  is  that  portfolio  managers 
have  the  opportunity  to  improve  yield,  without  taking 
a  commensurate  increase  in  risk,  by  investing  in  the 
domestic  CDs  of  regional  banks  that  meet  the  tradi- 
tional  tests  of  financial  soundness  but  that  do  not 
fall  within  the top  tier.4 
Eurodollar  CDs  Like  a  domestic  CD,  a  Euro- 
dollar  CD  is  a  dollar  denominated  instrument  evi- 
dencing  a  time  deposit  placed  with  a  bank  at  an 
agreed  upon  rate  of  interest  for  a  specific  period  of 
time.  Unlike  a  domestic  CD,  however,  a  Euro  CD 
is  issued  abroad,  either  by  the  foreign  branch  of  a 
U.  S.  bank  or  by  a  foreign  bank.  The  market  for 
Euro  CDs  is  centered  in  London  and  is  therefore 
frequently  called  the  London  dollar  CD  market, 
This  market  originated  in  1966  with  a  Eurodollar 
CD  issue  by  the  London  branch  of  Citibank.  The 
incentive  to  U.  S.  banks  to  start  issuing  CDs  abroad 
was  provided  by  regulations  restricting  their  ability 
to  raise  funds  in  the  domestic  money  market,  espe- 
cially  Regulation  Q.  Since  it  is  free  of  interest  rate 
regulation,  the  Eurodollar  market  provides  banks  the 
opportunity  to  raise  funds  for  domestic  lending  even 
when  their  ability  to  issue  domestic  CDs  is  restricted. 
The  Euro  CD  market  has  grown  rapidly  since  1966. 
As  shown  on  Chart  2,  Euro  CD  outstandings  at 
London  banks  totaled  over  $43  billion  at  year-end 
1979.  The  foreign  branches  of  U.  S.  banks  dominate 
the  London  dollar  CD  market,  accounting  for  about 
60  percent  of  all  CDs  issued  by  banks  located  in 
London.  Japanese  banks  rank  second  in  importance, 
their  share  of  the  market  having  increased  from  9 
percent  in  1976  to  17  percent  in  1979. 
Euro  CD  maturities  run  from  30  days  out  to  5 
years,  but  shorter  terms  ranging  from  one  month  to 
one  year  are  most  common.  By  and  large,  the  cus- 
tomer  base  is  the  same  as  that  for  domestic  CDs,  i.e., 
most  Euro  CDs  are  placed  with  the  same  large  car- 
4This  conclusion  is  reached  by  Crane  [3].  It  should  be 
pointed  out,  however,  that  investors  may  be  willing  to 
accept  somewhat  lower  yields  on  the  CDs  of  money 
center  banks  if  these  instruments  have  greater  market- 
ability  than  CDs  issued  by  regional  banks. 
porations  that  are  active  purchasers  of  domestic  CDs 
m  the  U.  S.  In  fact,  some  of  the  largest  CD  dealers 
in  the  U.  S.  are  represented  in  London,  where  they 
make  an  active  market  in  Euro  CDs.  These  dealers, 
and  many  large  investors  as  well,  view  their  invest- 
ment  activity  as  essentially  one  worldwide  position 
and  manage  their  Euro  CD  and  domestic  CD  port- 
folios  in  an  integrated  fashion. 
Inasmuch  as  there  is  a  five-hour  time  zone  differ- 
ence  between  London  and  New  York,  perfect  syn- 
chronization  of  delivery  and  payment  on  Euro  CDs 
is  very  difficult.  Therefore,  settlement  for  Euro 
CDs  is  normally  two  working  days  forward,  which 
is  the  value  date,  and  payment  is  made  in  clearing 
house  funds.  Dollar  settlement  is  made  in  New  York, 
even  though  the  certificates  themselves  are  issued  and 
held  in  safekeeping  in  London.  The  First  National 
Bank  of  Chicago  has  set  up  a  Euro  CD  clearing 
center  in  London  to  smooth  payment  and  delivery  on 
these  instruments.-  The  clearing  center,  which  is  open 
to  banks,  dealers,  and  investors,  operates  on  the 
clearinghouse  concept,  where  debits  and  credits  are 
cancelled  by  computer  and  only  net  settlement  is 
made. 
Yankee  CDs  Yankee  CDs  are  negotiable  CDs 
issued  and  payable  in  dollars  to  bearer  in  the  U.  S. 
(more  specifically,  in  New  York)  by  the  branch 
offices  of  major  foreign  banks.  They  are  sometimes 
referred  to  as  foreign-domestic  CDs.  The  foreign 
issuers  of  Yankee  CDs  are  well-known  international 
banks  headquartered  primarily  in  Western  Europe, 
England,  and  Japan.  Investors  in  Yankee  CDs  look 
to  the  creditworthiness  of  the  parent  organization  in 
assessing  their  risk,  since  the  obligation  of  a  branch 
of  a  foreign  bank  is  in  actuality  an  obligation  of  the 
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shorter  term  market;  most  newly  issued  instruments 
have  maturities  of  three  months  or  less. 
Foreign  banks  have  operated  branches  in  the  U.  S. 
for  many  years,  most  being  located  in  New  York 
City.  These  banks  were  initially  established  to 
provide  credit  services  to  their  parent  banks’  multi- 
national  business  customers.  Their  number  increased 
greatly  during  the  1970’s,  and  the  U.  S.  branches 
became  more  aggressive  competitors  for  the  loan 
business  of  U.  S.  corporations.  Their  major  sources 
of  funds  have  included  borrowings  from  foreign 
parent  organizations,  purchases  in  the  Federal  funds 
market,  and  more  recently  the  issuance  of  large  time 
deposits  to  U.  S.  investors.  At  year-end  1979  the 
time  deposits  of  U.  S.  branches  of  foreign  banks  due 
to  private  investors  and  public  bodies  totaled  about 
$25  billion.  It  is  estimated  that  about  $20  billion  of 
this  amount  was  in  the  form  of  negotiable  CDs. 
Some  individual  foreign  branches  have  Yankee  CDs 
outstanding  well  in  excess  of  $1  billion. 
The  U.  S.  branches  of  foreign  banks  at  first  placed 
most  of  their  Yankee  CDs  directly  with  their  estab- 
lished  loan  customers,  who  through  experience  were 
familiar  with  the  reputations  of  the  issuers.  Since 
their  names  were  not  well  known  outside  this  small 
group,  the  U.  S.  branches  of  foreign  banks  were 
forced  to  rely  on  dealers  to  market  their  CDs  as 
reliance  on  this  source  of  funds  grew.  The  largest 
part  of  their  offerings  have  until  recently  been  placed 
through  dealers,  several  of  which  are  now  active 
market  makers  for  Yankee  CDs.  Foreign  bank 
names  have  become  much  better  known  and  accept- 
able  in  the  U.  S.,  however,  so  that  today  it  is  much 
more  commonplace  for  foreign  branches  to  sell  their 
negotiable  CDs  directly  at  retail.  Secondary  market 
trading  in  Yankee  CDs  has  increased  greatly  in  just 
the  last  several  years  so  that  the  liquidity  of  such 
instruments  now  rivals  that  of  better  rated  domestic 
CDs. 
An  important  institutional  feature  of  foreign  bank- 
ing  operations  in  the  U.  S.  is  that,  until  recently, 
foreign  branches  have  been  state-licensed  and  not 
subject  to  Federal  Reserve  regulations.  Thus,  until 
recently  Yankee  CDs  have  not  been  subject  to  re- 
serve  requirements  under  Regulation  D.  This  ex- 
emption  from  regulation  probably  helped  establish 
the  market  for  Yankee  CDs,  because  the  U.  S. 
branches  of  foreign  banks  could  pay  higher  rates  on 
their  certificates  than  could  domestic  banks  but  still 
not  incur  higher  costs  than  their  U.  S.  banking  com- 
petitors  as  a  result  of  savings  on  reserve  require- 
ments.  The  International  Banking  Act  of  1978 
provides  that  large  foreign  banks  doing  business  in 
the  U.  S.  should  be  subject  to  the  same  Federal 
Reserve  regulations  as  domestic  banks.  The  U.  S. 
branches  of  large  foreign  banks  become  subject  to 
Regulations  D  and  Q  as  of  September  4,  1980. 
Yankee  CDs,  along  with  certain  other  managed 
liabilities  of  the  U.  S.  branches  of  foreign  banks, 
became  subject  to  reserve  requirements  for  the  first 
time  in  October  1979.  This  change  subjected  certain 
managed  liabilities  above  a  base  amount  to  an  8. 
percent  reserve  requirement,  which  was  subsequently 
increased  to  10  percent  in  March  1980,  and  then 
reduced  to  5  percent  in  May  1980.  The  imposition 
of  marginal  reserve  requirements  on  the  managed 
liabilities  of  the  U.  S.  branches  of  foreign  banks  may 
have  had  the  effect  of  slowing  the  growth  of  Yankee 
CDs.  This  is  because  the  market  is  still  young,  with 
new  issuing  banks  entering  regularly.  These  new 
banks  entering  the  Yankee  CD’  market  typically 
market  their  negotiable  CDs  aggressively  in  an 
attempt  to  build  volume  and  goodwill  quickly.  Start- 
ing  from  a low  or  zero  reserve  exempt  base,  however, 
the  newly  entering  banks  bear  a  reserve  cost  on  all 
of. their  negotiable  CDs,  not  just  a  fractional  amount 
like  established  issuers.  This  higher  cost  has  likely 
discouraged  new  entries  into  the  Yankee  CD  market. 
Thrift  Institution  CDs  Thrift  institutions,  par- 
ticularly  savings  and  loan  associations  (SLAs),  have 
become  active  competitors  for  large  time  deposits  not 
subject  to  Regulation  Q  ceilings.  Most  of  their  large 
domestic  time  deposits  are  practically  if  not  legally 
nonnegotiable,  i.e.,  there  is  very  little  secondary 
market  activity  in  thrift  CDs.  The  large  denomina- 
tion  CDs  of  FSLIC  insured  SLAs  totaled  nearly 
$30  billion  at  year-end  1979. 
Recent  changes  in  Federal  Home  Loan  Bank 
Board  regulations  grant  Federally  insured  savings 
and  loans  considerably  broadened  authority  to  market 
Euro  CDs.  At  least  one  large  California  SLA  has 
placed  a  $10  million  package  of  unsecured  CDs  in 
the  Eurodollar  market.  The  success  of  such  place- 
ments  depends  on  the  size  and  financial  strength  of 
the  issuing  thrift.  Other  thrifts  have  taken  steps  to 
place  Euro  CDs  that  are  backed  by  mortgage  loan 
collateral.  Part  of  this  process  involves  obtaining  a 
credit  rating  from  Standard  &  Poor’s  Corporation, 
which  is  now  making  such  ratings.  So  far,  these 
mortgage-backed  offerings  have  been  for  longer 
terms,  i.e.,  five  years. 
Nonnegotiable  CDs  Nonnegotiable  CDs  are  an 
important  part  of  total  large  time  deposits  issued  by 
commercial  banks.  In  fact,  nonnegotiable  CDs  of 
U.  S.  banks  have  grown  faster  than  domestic  nego- 
tiable  CDs  in  recent  years  and  now  are  more  impor- 
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funds.  It  is  important  to  understand  what  nonnego- 
tiable  CDs  are,  because  many  investors  active  in  the 
market  for  negotiable  CDs  are  willing  to  substitute 
between  the  two  types  of  instruments. 
Nonnegotiable  CDs  are  not  considered  money 
market  instruments  because  they  lack  the  liquidity  of 
negotiable  certificates.  Some  nonnegotiable  instru- 
ments,  such  as  time  deposits  open  account,  are  legally 
nonnegotiable.  Others,  such  as  registered  CDs,  are 
technically  negotiable  but  are  in  practice  nonnegotia- 
ble  because  of  the  administrative  difficulty  involved 
in  changing  ownership.  Some  banks  have  ceased 
issuing  certificates  and  have  instead  instituted  book- 
entry  accounting  procedures  for  registered  CDs. 
This  practice  seems  to  confirm  that  liquidity  is  a 
secondary  consideration  to  investors  purchasing  such 
instruments. 
Among  the  largest  investors  in  nonnegotiable  CDs 
are  public  bodies,  e.g.,  state  and  municipal  govern- 
ments.  Often,  state  law  requires  that  public  bodies 
invest  their  funds  locally,  that  all  investments  be 
registered  in  the  name  of  the  governmental  unit,  and 
that  investments  be  secured.  A  large  share  of  banks’ 
total  large  time  deposits  are  secured  CDs  issued  in 
registered  form  to  state  and  local  governments.  As 
might  be  expected,  regional  banks  are  more  heavily 
dependent  upon  such  funds  than  are  the  money  center 
banks. 
It  is  not  just  public  bodies  that  invest  in  nonnego- 
tiable  certificates,  however.  Some  corporate  inves- 
tors  are  willing  to  sacrifice  the  liquidity  provided  by 
an  instrument  that  can  be  traded  in  the  secondary 
market  for  a  small  increase  in  yield.  Also,  some 
banks  have  gentleman’s  agreements  with  customers 
who  take  their  registered  or  book-entry  CDs  which 
provide  that,  in  the  event  cash  is  needed  on  an  emer- 
gency  basis,  the  bank  will  exchange  the  registered 
CD  for  a  bearer  CD.  In  addition  to  nonfinancial 
corporations,  some  money  market  funds  have  in- 
vested  in  nonnegotiable  CDs. 
Risk  and  Return  Negotiable  CDs  subject  inves- 
tors  to  two  major  types  of  risk,  credit  risk’  and  mar- 
ketability  risk.  Credit  risk  is  the  risk  of  default  on 
the  part  of  the  bank  issuing  the  CD.  This  is  relevant 
even  for  U.  S.  banks  which  are  insured  by  the  FDIC, 
since  domestic  CDs  are  issued  in  large  denominations 
and  deposit  insurance  only  covers  up  to  $100,000  of a 
depositor’s  funds.  Marketability  risk  reflects  the 
fact  that  a  ready  buyer  for  a  CD  might  not  be  avail- 
able  when  the  owner  is  ready  to, sell.  Although  the 
secondary  market  in  CDs  is  well  developed,  it  does 
not  possess  the  depth  of  the  U.  S.  Government  se- 
curities  market.  These  risks  are  reflected  in  the 
yields  on  negotiable  CDs.  It  should  be  noted,  how- 
ever,  that  yields  on  money  market  instruments  may 
vary  for  reasons  other  than  differences  in  risk,  e.g., 
due  to  changes  in  their  relative  supplies. 
Chart  3  plots  the  spread  between  the  secondary 
market  yields  on  two  types  of  3-month  CDs,  domestic 
and  Euro,  and  the  secondary  market  rate  on  3-month 
Treasury  bills.  The  spread  is  positive  and  tends  to 
widen  in  periods  of high  interest  rates.  For  example, 
the  domestic  CD-Treasury  bill  spread  was  generally 
below  100  basis  points  for  the  periods  1971-72  and 
1976-78,  but  widened  greatly  in  1973-74.  The  spread 
peaked  at  458  basis  points  in  August  1974.  The 
chart  shows  that  rates  on  Euro  CDs  are  almost 
always  above  those  on  domestic  CDs,  typically  by 
about  20-30  basis  points,  and  that  the  Euro-domestic 
CD  rate  spread  tends  to  widen  in  periods,  of  high 
interest  rates.  The  higher  rate  on  Euro  CDs  in  part 
reflects  the  credit  risk  premium  required  by  investors 
in  these  instruments;  this  premium  tends  to  increase 
in  periods  of  stress  in  the  financial  markets.  There 
is  no  reserve  requirement  against  such  deposits,  and 
therefore  the  total  cost  to  the  issuing  institution  is 
not  necessarily  greater  than  the  total  cost  to  a  do- 
mestic  bank  issuing  a  CD.  In  fact,  the  reserve  ad- 
justed  costs  of  domestic  and  Euro  CDs  tend  to  be 
very  close  in  times  of  financial  market  normalcy  [6]. 
There  is  no  published  rate  series  for  Yankee  CDs. 
Dealers  indicate,  however,  that  Yankee  CD  rates 
move  very  closely,  within  plus  or  minus  10  basis 
points,  of  Euro  CD  rates.  These  two  types  of  CDs 
are  good  substitutes  and  their  rates  should  be  ex- 
pected  to  move  close  together  except  due  to  technical 
factors,  such  as  relative  supply.  On  average,  though, 
Yankee  CD  rates  average  somewhat  lower  than  Euro 
CD  rates.  There  are  two  reasons  for  this.  First, 
Yankee  CDs,  unlike  Euro  CDs  are  subject  to  U.  S. 
laws  and  regulations  and  therefore  do  not  bear  sover- 
eign  or  foreign  country  risk.  Second,  it  is  easier 
and  less  costly  for  dealers  to  engage  in  Yankee  CD 
transactions  than  in  Euro  CD  transactions.  Yankee 
CDs  are  purchased  in  the  U.  S.  and  positions  are 
financed  with  RPs  or  Federal  funds,  while  Euro 
CDs  are  purchased  abroad  and  entail  international 
money  transfers. 
Quality  Ratings  One  major  rating  firm,  Moody’s 
Investors  Service,  Inc.,  has  begun  to  rate  the  CDs  of 
banks.  So  far;  only  a  small  number  of  regional  U.  S. 
banks  have  received  ratings  and  a  handful  of  applica- 
tions  are  in  process.  Foreign  banks  issuing  Yankee 
CDs,  however,  have  more  actively  sought  formal 
ratings  than  have  U.  S.  banks.  This  is  understand- 
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names  with  U.  S.  investors.  The  rating  process  used 
by  Moody’s  for  CDs  is virtually  identical  to  that  used 
for  rating  commercial  paper.  It  is  not  the  particular 
issue  that  is  rated  but  rather  the  issuing  organization 
itself.  The  CD  ratings,  like  those  for  commercial 
paper,  are  designated  P-l,  P-2,  and  P-3.  Because  of 
the  closeness  of the  rating  processes,  one  should  never 
expect  to  see  a  divergence  between  a  bank’s  CD 
rating  and  its  commercial  paper  rating.  It  is  possible, 
however,  for  a  bank’s  CD  rating  to  differ  somewhat 
from  the  commercial  paper  rating  of  its  parent  hold- 
ing  company. 
Standard  &  Poor’s  Corporation  has  begun  rating 
the  CDs  of  SLAs.  Like  Moody’s,  S&P  has  experi- 
ence  rating  commercial  paper  issued  by  SLAs,  but 
has  so  far  applied  bond  rating  methods  to  thrift  CDs 
because  of  their  longer  terms.  If  asked  to  rate  short- 
term  thrift  CDs,  S&P  will  likely  apply  a  variant  of 
its  commercial  paper  rating  system. 
Rates  and  Maturities  During  the  first  decade  of 
their  existence,  negotiable  CDs  were  written  exclu- 
sively  under  fixed  interest  coupon  contracts.  Cer- 
tificates  were  written  specifying  a  particular  rate  of 
interest  that  would  be  paid  for  a  given  term  to  ma- 
turity.  This  pricing  arrangement  suited  investors 
quite  well,  at  least  during  the  relatively  stable  interest 
rate  environment  of  the  1960’s.  Those  seeking  a 
compromise  between  return  and  liquidity  could  invest 
in  short-dated  negotiable  CDs,  while  those  seeking 
extra  yield  could  extend  the  maturity  of  their  invest- 
ments  out  to  six  months  or  perhaps  even  longer.  So 
long  as  the  upward  sloping  yield  curve  remained  the 
norm,  banks  and  investors  had  a  reasonable  basis  for 
trading  off  higher  yield  against  longer  term. 
In  the  latter  part  of  the  1960’s  interest  rate  condi- 
tions  changed  dramatically.  Interest  rate  fluctuations 
increased,  and  the  general  level  of  rates  began  to 
trend  upward.  Under  such  circumstances,  investors 
can  be  expected  to  shift  their  preferences  to  shorter 
term  instruments,  and  this  happened  in  the  CD  mar- 
ket;  by  1974  the  average  maturity  of  outstanding 
domestic  CDs  fell  dramatically  to  about  two  months 
from  the  three-and-one-half-month  length  more  com- 
mon  in  the  1960’s.  In  September  1974  the  Federal 
Reserve  provided  banks  an  incentive  to  lengthen  their 
negotiable  CD  maturities  by  restructuring  reserve 
requirements  in  such  a  way  as  to  raise  the  reserve 
cost  of  shorter  term  certificates.  This  incentive  was 
reinforced  in  December  1974  when  reserve  require- 
ments  were  set  at  6  percent  for  negotiable  CDs  with 
an  original  maturity  of  less  than  six  months  and  at 
3  percent  for  negotiable  CDs  with  an  original  ma- 
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reserve  requirement  was  further  lowered  to  1 percent 
for  CDS  with  original  maturities  of  four  years  or 
more,  and  finally  in  January  1976  the  requirement 
was  lowered  to  2½  percent  on  certificates  with  orig- 
inal  maturities  of  from  six  months  to  four  years.  In 
keeping  with  this  pattern,  the  marginal  reserve  pro- 
gram  introduced  in  October  1979  exempts  CDs’  with 
original  maturities  of  one  year  and  greater.  In  addi- 
tion  to  these  changes  in  reserve  requirements,  do- 
mestic  banks  had  an  incentive  to  increase  CD  ma- 
turities  as  a  result  of  the  deteriorating  liquidity  posi- 
tions  of  their  balance  sheets.  By  the  mid-1970’s, 
therefore,  the  time  was  ripe  for  a fundamental  change 
in  the  terms  under  which  negotiable  CDs  had  tradi- 
tionally  been  offered. 
Fixed-Rate  Rollover  CDs  Early  in  1977  a  large 
New  York  bank,  Morgan  Guaranty  Trust  Company, 
introduced  to  its  customers  on  a  selective  basis 
fixed-rate  rollover  CDs,  or  “roly  poly”  CDs,  in 
minimum  amounts  of  $5  million.  These  instruments 
had  full terms  to  maturity  of  from  two  to  five  years, 
but  consisted  of  a  series  of  6-month  maturity  instru- 
ments.  Investors  would  sign  a  contract  to  leave  a 
deposit  with  the  bank  for,  say,  four  years,  but  in- 
stead  of  receiving  a  CD  maturing  in  four  years 
would  receive  a 6-month  CD.  The  contract  obligated 
the  investor  to  renew;  or  roll  over,  the  6-month  in- 
strument  eight  consecutive  times  at  the  rate  negoti- 
ated  at  the  inception  of  the  contract.  Although  the 
bank  hoped  to  qualify  for  the  four  year  CD  reserve 
requirement  with  these  deposits,  a  ruling  by  the 
Federal  Reserve  made  the  rollover  CDs  reservable 
at  the  higher  6-month  maturity  reserve  requirement. 
These  instruments  bore  rates  somewhat  above  the 
rate  on  Treasury  notes  of  equal  maturity,  but  below 
the  rate  offered  on  a  straight  two  to  five  year  CD. 
The  feeling  was  that  an  investor  would  earn  the 
long-term  rate  but  get  enhanced  liquidity  since  a 
single  6-month  issue  in  the  series  could  be  sold  in  the 
secondary  market.  This  fixed-rate  type  of  instru- 
ment  proved  more  attractive  to  the  issuing  banks 
than  to  the  investing  public  during  a  period  of  rising 
interest  rates.  Consequently,  a  sizable  market  in 
fixed-rate  rollover  CDs  never  developed. 
Variable  Rate  CDs  Variable  rate  or  variable 
coupon  CDs  (VRCDs  or  VCCDs)  have  the  rollover 
feature  described  above  but  also  entail  periodic  re- 
settings  of  the  coupon  rate  and  periodic  payment  of 
interest.  Interest  on  each  component  or  “leg”  of  a 
VRCD  is  calculated  according  to  the  same  rules  as 
on  conventional  CDs.  The  dated  date  is  the  original 
dated  date  for  the  first  leg,  and  for  subsequent  legs 
it  is  the  date  of  the  interest  payment  on  the  preceding 
leg.  VRCDs  were  first  offered  in  the  Euro  CD 
market,  where  floating  rate  instruments  were  an 
accepted  method  of  doing  business  long  before  they 
were  in’ the  U.  S  The  VRCD  was  initially  intro- 
duced  in  the  domestic  and  Yankee  CD  markets  by 
those  large  banks  having  Euro  CD  experience,  but 
the  new  method  of  writing  certificates  was  quickly 
adopted  by  the  major  regional  banks  as  well.  VRCDs 
were  introduced  domestically  in  1975,  grew  in  popu- 
larity  in  the  latter  1970’s,  and  have  now  become  a 
major  innovation  in  the  market  for  negotiable  CDs. 
VRCDs  range  in  full  maturity  from  six  months  to 
four  years,  the  most  common  full  maturities  being 
six  months  and  one  year.  The  rollover  period  for 
these  instruments  varies.  For  example,  from  1975  to 
1977,  three-  and  six-month  rollovers  were  common. 
The  higher  short-term  interest  rates  of  1979  and 
1980,  however,  have  resulted  in  the  three-month  and 
one-month  rollovers  becoming  standard.  Investor 
preferences  for  full  maturity  and  rollover  frequency 
are  directly  related  to  expected  interest  rate  patterns, 
‘periods  of  stable  or  declining  rates  leading  to  prefer- 
ences  for  longer  full  maturities  and  longer  rolls,  and 
periods  of  rising  rates  and  upward  sloping  yield 
curves  leading  to  preferences  for  shorter  maturities 
and  ‘shorter  rolls.  The  four  VRCD  issues  having  -the 
greatest  popularity  at  present  are  ( 1)  six-month 
‘(full  ‘maturity)  /three-month  (roll),  (2)  six-month/ 
one-month,  (3)  one-year/three-month,  and  (4)  one- 
year/one-month. 
Coupon  rates  set on  each  new  leg  of  VRCDs  are 
based  on  the  preceding  day’s  secondary  market  CD 
rates  reported  daily  by  the  Federal  Reserve  Bank  of 
New  York.  These  are  averages  of  offered  rates 
quoted  by  major  dealers.  Collection  of  interest  pay- 
ments,  and  of  principal  at  final  maturity,  is  made  by 
presenting  the  VRCD  to  the  issuing  bank  or  the 
issuing  bank’s  agent.  When  presented  for  collection 
of  interest,  the  certificate  is  stamped  with  the  amount 
of  the  previous  period’s  interest  and  the  new  coupon 
rate.  Payment  of  interest  and  principal  is  made  in 
immediately  available  funds.  VRCDs  normally 
carry  an  interest  premium  over  the  rate  one  would 
expect  to  receive  on  a conventional  CD.  This  premi- 
um,  which  compensates  investors  for  the  credit  risk 
entailed  by  tying  funds  up  for  longer  periods,  in- 
creases  with  the  maturity  of the  VRCD.  The  premi- 
um  has  usually  been  about  15  basis  points  for  six- 
month  full  maturities,  20  basis  points  for  one-year 
full  maturities,  and  25  basis  points  for  eighteen-month 
full  maturities.  As  in  the  case  of  conventional  CDs, 
VRCDs  issued  by  the  top  tier  banks  carry  somewhat 
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institutions. 
The  typical  size  of a VRCD  issue  ranges  from  $50- 
$200  million  for  large  banks  and  $25-$100  million  for 
smaller  banks,  but  issues  as  large  as  $400  million  are 
not  uncommon.  The  largest  portion  of VRCD  issues 
is  underwritten  by  dealers,  who  usually  charge  the 
issuing  bank  a  small  commission  for  underwriting 
and  distribution  services.  Dealers  have  been  willing 
to  take  larger  positions  in  VRCDs  than  in  longer 
term  conventional  CDs  since  there  is  less  market  risk 
involved  and  because  retail  demand  has  proved  quite 
strong.  So  far,  retail  demand  has  been  so  strong  that 
dealers  have  placed  a  major  portion  of  newly  issued 
VRCDs  on  an  order  basis. 
Investors  treat  VRCDs  as  a  conventional  CD  once 
the  coupon  has  been  set  for  the  last  time  and  the 
certificate  is  on  its  last  leg.  Since  VRCDs  carry  an 
interest  premium  over  the  rate  paid  on  a conventional 
CD,  a  VRCD,  on  its  last  leg  offers  the  potential  for 
trading  profits. 
Estimates  by  market  participants  place  the  total 
amount  of  VRCDs  outstanding  in  early  1980  at  $12 
billion,  about  double  the  amount  outstanding  only 
six  months  earlier.  Most  of  these  are  domestic  CDs. 
Thus,  in  the  short  time  since  they  have  become  popu- 
lar,  VRCDs  have  grown  to  equal  over  10  percent  of 
the  total  volume  of  domestic  CDs  outstanding.  To 
date,  money  market  funds  have  been  the  most  active 
investors  in  VRCDs. 
Dealers  There  are  currently  about  25  dealers  in 
CDs,  all  of  which  are  active  in  the  domestic  CDs  of 
top  tier  banks  and  some  of  which  specialize  in  re- 
gional  names  or  Yankee  CDs.  The  center  of  the 
dealer  market  is  New  York  City,  but  the  larger 
dealers  have  branches  in  major  U.  S.  cities  and  in 
London.  Two  main  functions  of  the  CD  dealers  are 
to  distribute  CDs  at  retail,  either  after  first  taking 
new  issues  into  their  own  positions  or  by  acting  as 
brokers,  and  to  support  a  secondary  market  in  nego- 
tiable  CDs.  In  accomplishing  the  latter,  dealers  must 
stand  ready  to  make  a  market,  i.e.,  buy  and  sell  CDs. 
Bid  and  offering  prices  are  constantly  maintained 
and  the  typical  spread  is  between  5  and  10  basis 
points,  but  narrower  spreads  on  good  names  with 
short  remaining  terms  to  maturity  are  common. 
The  normal  round-lot  trade  in  negotiable  CDs  be- 
tween  dealers  and  retail  customers  is  $1  million,  but 
increases  to  $5  million  for  interdealer  trades.  There 
is,  of  course,  a  great  deal  of  variety  among  the  CDs 
being  traded  at  any  given  time  with  respect  to  issuer, 
maturity,  and  other  contractual  terms.  Consequently, 
dealers  post  bid  and  asked  prices  for  certificates 
issued  by  a particular  tier  bank,  with  maturity  identi- 
fied  as  early  or  late  in  a  particular  month.  For 
‘example,  the  bid  and  ask  price  for  a  top  trading 
name  might  be  for  “early  December”  or  “late  Janu- 
ary.” 
Financing  of  dealer  CD  positions  is  largely  done 
using  RPs.  Since  CD  collateral  is  more  risky  than 
U.  S.  Government  security  collateral,  RPs  against 
CDs  are  usually  slightly  more  expensive  than  RPs 
against,  say,  Treasury  bills.  For  the  same  reason, 
it  is  more  difficult  to  get  term  RP  financing  for  CDs. 
Normal  practice  in  the  RP  market  is  to  finance  the 
face  value  of  a  money  market  instrument.  Since 
CDs  bear  interest,  dealers  must  finance any  accrued 
interest  on  CDs  held  in  position  from  some  source 
other  than  RP,  e.g.,  from  capital.. 
Growth  in  dealer  activity  has  paralleled  growth  in 
the  market  for  negotiable  CDs.  As  the  market  ex- 
panded  in  the  1960’s  daily  average  dealer  transactions 
were  in  the  $50-$60  million  range,  and  the  daily 
average  dealer  positions  ranged  from  $200-$300  mil- 
lion.  As  mentioned,  the  secondary  market  nearly 
dried  up  in  1969,  daily  average  dealer  transactions 
falling  to  only  $9  million  and  daily  average  positions 
falling  to  only  $27  million  during  that  year.  Dealer 
activity  burgeoned  in  the  1970’s,  when  trading  oppor- 
tunities  increased  due  to  the  more  aggressive  market- 
ing  of  negotiable  CDs  by  regional  banks  and  with 
the  development  of  the  Yankee  CD.  By  1975,  for 
example,  daily  average  dealer  positions  increased 
about  five-fold  to  $1.4  billion  and  transactions  in- 
creased  sixteen  times  to  $800  million.  By  1979, 
positions  further  expanded  to  $2.7  billion  and  trans- 
actions  to  $1.7  billion. 
Summary  The  market  for  negotiable  CDs  issued 
domestically  by  U.  S.  banks  grew  rapidly  but,  due  to 
the  effects  of  interest  rate  regulation,  unevenly  during 
the  1960’s.  Regulation  Q  restrictions  on  rates  that 
could  be  paid  on  domestic  CDs  led  to the  introduction 
of  the  Euro  CD  in  1966.  After  interest-  rate  ceilings 
on  domestic  CDs  were  removed  in  the  early  1970’s 
the  market  grew  dramatically.  Regional  banks  be- 
came  particularly  active  issuers  during  this  period, 
and  the  U.  S.  branches  of foreign  banks  began  issuing 
Yankee  CDs.  Most  recently,  savings  and  loan  associ- 
ations  have  also  begun  issuing  CDs.  Investors  can 
now  choose  among  a  number  of  issuers  in  selecting 
CDs,  i.e.,  domestic,  Euro,  Yankee,  and  thrift. 
Not  only  have  the  types  of  issuers  multiplied,  but 
the  character  of  CD  contracts  has  changed  as  well. 
The  conventional  fixed-rate  CD,  which  is  primarily  a 
short-term  instrument,  has  been  modified  to  extend 
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ment,  the  variable  rate  CD,  has  quickly  gained  popu-  CDs  has  been  particularly  rapid  in  recent  years.  This 
larity  among  investors.  The  terms  under  which  change  is  the  outcome  of  competitive  forces  working 
VRCDs  are  offered,  however,  change  constantly  in  to  redesign  a financial  market  to  better  suit  the  needs 
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